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PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS: IN DANGER IN THE WAKE OF "BONG HITS
4 JESUS"
Zachary Martin+
Teachers are not just teachers. They have lives outside of their jobs. Many
attend political rallies carrying signs, some decorate their cars, and others wear
clothes bearing logos of their favorite sports teams, all of which may be
considered expressive activities.l However, every day at school they must put
these lives aside and go to work. A teacher's typical school day involves
standing in front of a classroom full of children and explaining the day's
lesson. They describe concepts, show pictures, play films, sketch drawings,
conduct experiments, and make models. These are all expressive activities.
Thus, a vital question implicated by this dual role is what expression by
teachers is constitutionally protected in the classroom? Can teachers post
materials on their walls that have a religious theme? 2  Is bringing Woody
Harrelson into the classroom to advocate the use of industrial hemp
constitutionally protected?4  What about voicing complaints regarding class
size and the lack of student discipline?
5
Before answering these questions, another threshold question must first be
answered: what exactly is a classroom? Webster's dictionary defines
classroom as "any place where one learns or gains experience." 6 "Classroom"
+ A.B., Harvard College, 2006; J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law. The author thanks Professor Roger C. Hartley for his expert
assistance, particularly for the labor law suggestion.
1. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990) (holding that
painting messages on cars is expressive); Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir.
1997) (The court asserted that "there is no question that the T-shirts [containing social advocacy
messages] are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of the First
Amendment ...."); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1367 n.16 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting
that expressive activity includes political signs at a rally).
2. See Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820, 829 (E.D. Va. 2006),
aff'd, 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 387 (2007) (concluding the answer is
"no").
3. Industrial hemp is a plant that can produce either marijuana or a valuable fiber that can
be used to make paper and clothing. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1042
(6th Cir. 2001); see also Ray Hansen, Industrial Hemp Profile, Dec. 2006, http://www.
agmrc.org/agmrc/commodity/biomass/industrialhemp/industrialhempprofile.htm (noting that
industrial hemp is a cannabis plant made illegal by the Controlled Substances Act and that it can
be used to make "sails, riggings, canvas, ropes, clothing and paper").
4. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1055 (concluding the answer is "yes").
5. See Cliffv. Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding this was
not constitutionally protected speech).
6. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 381 (2d ed. 2001).
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is a term that no longer simply encompasses a room in a school with some
desks and a chalkboard. Teachers sometimes take their students outside to
show them wildlife or to take them on field trips. Learning presumably takes
place and the students gain practical hands-on experience from those exercises.
With recent technological advances,7 the scope of what constitutes a classroom
continues to expand. It is not far-fetched to imagine holographic teachers
visible to students through a virtual classroom in the near future. Herein lies
one of the problems facing traditional teachers' free speech rights: at present,
where does the classroom stop? Teachers may end up living in a "Big
Brother" situation. They ma y feel as though their speech is constantly being
monitored, ultimately chilling their speech.
7. See Global Virtual Classroom, http://www.virtualclassroom.org (last visited Oct. 4,
2007), for an example of how the internet has expanded the scope of providing education. The
"Global Virtual Classroom (GVC) project is a collection of free, on-line educational activities and
resources. It aims to complement the efforts of governments and education departments around
the world to integrate technology into their classrooms and curricula and to link their schools to
the information superhighway." Id.; see also Classroom Connection Program, http://www.
creativeconnections.org/classroom connection/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2007). Through the Internet,
Classroom Connection creates "partnerships between 8-to-18-year-old students from the United
States and countries around the world." Classroom Connection Program, supra. This partnership
is furthered by giving "all participating teachers and students ... the opportunity to exchange
ideas and insights with one another on [their] specially designed ExchangeOnline Website." Id.
8. Big Brother is a concept taken from George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. GEORGE
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 2-3 (David Levin ed., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1963).
The novel begins with Winston Smith, a citizen of Oceania, ascending a flight of stairs in order to
reach his flat. Id. In the staircase, there were large pictures "of a man of about forty-five, with a
heavy black mustache and ruggedly handsome features." Id. at 2. The pictures were only of the
man's head, with the caption: "Big Brother Is Watching You." Id. (emphasis omitted). Orwell
paints a picture of a society that is completely monitored by the government, one in which
citizens have "no way of knowing whether [they are] being watched at any given moment." Id. at
3. This was because everyone in Oceania had telescreens in their homes, which could hear and
see everything. Id. The telescreens were also constantly monitored by the Thought Police. Id.
As a result, people lived with the "assumption that every sound [they] made was overheard, and,
except in darkness, every moment scrutinized." Id.
In addition to being constantly monitored, the society banned expression:
The thing [Winston] was about to do was to open a diary. This was not illegal (nothing
was illegal, since there were no longer any laws), but if detected it was reasonably
certain that it would be punished by death, or at least by twenty-five years in a forced-
labor camp.
Id at 4. The society also aired a program every day called "the Two Minutes Hate" in which
citizens were forced to watch the telescreens. Id. at 6. The primary focus of "the Two Minutes
Hate" was on a man named Emmanuel Goldstein. Id. In all of the telecasts, Goldstein "was
abusing Big Brother, he was denouncing the dictatorship of the Party, he was demanding the
immediate conclusion of peace with Eurasia, he was advocating freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Citizens were
raised to hate Goldstein who vouched for these freedoms of expression, id., freedoms that are
embraced by our society's First Amendment.
9. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (The "threat of sanctions may deter
[the exercise of expression] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.") The
chilling effect arises from the fear of reprisal from exercising constitutionally protected freedom
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There is no Supreme Court precedent analyzing whether a teacher's °
classroom speech" is protected by the First Amendment.12 A teacher's First
Amendment rights become an issue when a teacher is disciplined for an action
that arguably can be considered an exercise of free speech.' 3 As a result, the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals' 4 have adopted two very different tests
of expression. Id; see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (naming the
phenomenon described in Button as the "chilling effect"). In other words, people will not express
themselves in a manner that is constitutionally protected because they fear the repercussions from
doing so. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) ("When one must guess
what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will 'steer far wider of the
unlawful zone ... ').
10. For purposes of this Comment, a "teacher" means a public school teacher who teaches
in a primary or secondary school. Private primary or secondary school teachers and college
professors are not discussed.
11. This Comment will not discuss a teacher's right to academic freedom in the classroom.
"Academic freedom," as used in this Comment, is the teacher's ability to choose his "own
curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates."
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990). The courts have
uniformly held that the First Amendment does not protect the right to academic freedom. Id; see
also Adams v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975) ("In the case at
bar the teaching methods ... may have had educational value as the expert testified, but this is not
equivalent to saying that [the teachers] had a constitutional right absolute in character to employ
their methods in preference to more standard or orthodox ones."); Ahem v. Bd. of Educ., 456
F.2d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1972) ("[O]ur conclusion is that Miss Ahem was invested by the
Constitution with no right ... to persist in a course of teaching behavior which contravened the
valid dictates of her employers, the public school board, regarding classroom method ... ").
12. See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (predicting how
the Supreme Court would examine teachers' free speech rights in the classroom); Karen C. Daly,
Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 4
(2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's avoidance of the issue); Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public
School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
693, 694-95 (1990) (noting the Supreme Court's lack of case law addressing the First
Amendment rights of teachers); Kara Lynn Grice, Note, Striking an Unequal Balance: The
Fourth Circuit Holds that Public School Teachers Do Not Have First Amendment Rights to Set
Curricula in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1960, 1985
(1999) (explaining that the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the issue of the First
Amendment protections of a teacher's classroom speech).
13. See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (6th Cir. 2001)
(addressing a teacher's claim that she was terminated for her decision to bring Woody Harrelson
into the classroom to speak to her students, an action later held to be within the realm of protected
speech).
14. For examples of each Circuit's approach, see Roberts v. Newark Pub. Sch., 232 F.
App'x 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a teacher's speech was on a matter of private concern
and was therefore afforded no First Amendment protection); Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729,
738 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that a teacher's right to speak on a matter of public concern
outweighed the school's interest); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724
(8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a teacher's speech was not protected by the First Amendment);
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
teacher's speech did "not constitute protected speech and [had] no First Amendment protection");
Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1994)
(showing a picture of a topless woman in the classroom was not constitutionally protected); Cliff
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to address this issue. 15  A few circuits 16 borrow standards developed in
Supreme Court cases involving the free speech rights of government
employees 17 to create a standard that is referred to as the Pickering-Connick
standard throughout this Comment. Other circuits employ principles
developed in Supreme Court cases analyzing the free speech rights of
students' 8 to create a standard that this Comment refers to as the Tinker-
Hazelwood standard.
v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding the teacher's First Amendment
claims failed because the speech did not touch upon a matter of public concern); Ward v. Hickey,
996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the teacher's classroom speech was subject to a
reasonable restriction and thus not protected by the First Amendment); Miles v. Denver Pub.
Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the teacher's speech was not
constitutionally protected); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir.
1989) (finding that the teacher's speech was not protected); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1516
(11 th Cir. 1986) (holding that the speech did not amount to a matter of public concern, resulting
in a failed First Amendment claim); Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682
F.2d 858, 864-85 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the plaintiff's First Amendment claim failed). The
District of Columbia nearly addressed the issue in Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1177
(D.C. Cir. 1969). However, Goldwasser involved a civilian employee hired by the Air Force to
teach language at a Texas Air Force base. Id. at 1171. Thus, Goldwasser does not fall within the
scope of this Comment because the educational setting was military-operated rather than a public
school. See also Lackland Air Force Base, http://www.lackland.af.mil/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2007)
(The website states that "Lackland Air Force Base is no longer an open installation." It "provides
basic military, professional and technical skills, and English language training for the Air Force
15. See, e.g., Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir.
2001) (alleging that Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1998) employs a
different view that is, arguably, a third test). However, Edwards involved a state university
teacher, as opposed to a public school teacher as defined in this Comment. Edwards, 156 F.3d at
489.
16. "Circuits," as used in this Comment, means the United States District Courts and the
United States Courts of Appeals, or both. Circuits and courts are used interchangeably in this
Comment, unless otherwise noted.
17. See Roberts, 232 F. App'x at 127 (analyzing whether the speech was on a matter of
public concern and quoting Connick); Leary, 228 F.3d at 737 (noting that Connick requires the
speech to be on a matter of public concern and that Pickering requires the interest in speaking on
that matter must outweigh the government's interest); Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69 (beginning the
analysis with Connick's requirement that the speech must be on a matter of public concern); Cliff,
42 F.3d at 409 (setting the analytical framework with the principles established in Connick and
Pickering); Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 797, 799 (noting Connick requires the speech to be on a matter
of public concern and that the principles of Pickering balance the competing interests of the
speaker and the employer); Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1513-14 (citing Connick and Pickering when
setting forth the court's framework for the analysis); Nicholson, 682 F.2d at 865 (using the
principles established in Pickering); Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822-24
(E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 387 (2007)
(explaining and applying the Pickering-Connick standard).
18. See Lacks, 147 F.3d at 724 (using the principles from Tinker and Hazelwood); Silano,
42 F.3d at 722-23 (using the analysis employed in Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1stCir. 1993)
which borrowed the principles established in Hazelwood); Ward, 996 F.2d at 452 (using the
principles of Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), which are the same as in
1186 [Vol. 57:1183
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The Court paved the road for evaluating government employee speech in
Pickering v. Board of Education.19  Essentially, the Court created a test in
which the determination of whether the individual's speech is on a matter of
20public concern is outcome determinative. Connick v. Myers evoked the same
principles as Pickering, but in a factually different setting that provided an
illustration of the doctrine at work.2 1
Although the Pickering-Connick standard seems like an appropriate
methodology to employ when analyzing a teacher's speech, because teachers
are government employees, several circuits have refused to do so. 22 Instead,
these courts use the principles established in the Supreme Court cases that
evaluate whether student classroom speech is protected.23 This test, the
Tinker-Hazelwood standard, originated from the Vietnam protest case, Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.24 The Tinker Court
held that students and teachers retain their First Amendment rights when in
school2 5 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier further clarified and limited
the Tinker doctrine by holding that schools may limit student expression,
provided that the restrictions are linked to "legitimate pedagogical" interests.
26
The absence of Supreme Court precedent concerning the First Amendment
rights of teachers in the classroom created dissonance among the circuits in
deciding which standard to apply. 27 Not only are there different standards, but
Hazelwood); Miles, 944 F.2d at 777 (discussing the Pickering principles in contrast to the
Hazelwood principles and ultimately choosing to employ the Hazelwood principles).
19. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
20. See, e.g., id. at 574 (holding that a teacher's right to speak on a matter of public
importance is not grounds for his dismissal). Compare Cliff, 42 F.3d at 411 (holding speech was
not on a matter of public concern so plaintiffs "claims fail as a matter of law"), and Lee, 418 F.
Supp. 2d at 829 (finding no triable issue of whether the teacher's speech was on a matter of public
concern, therefore rejecting his First Amendment claim), with Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1053, 1055
(finding that the speech was on a matter of public concern and holding it constitutionally
protected), and Leary, 228 F.3d at 737-38 (holding that speech on a matter of public concern is
constitutionally protected).
21. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that an employer has great
latitude in reprimanding an employee who speaks on a matter of private concern).
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
25. Id. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
26. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("[W]e hold that
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.").
27. See W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of
Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301, 304 (1998) (stating that the Hazelwood-Connick standard is the
dominate standard, but noting disagreement over how it should be applied); Grice, supra note 12,
at 1985-86 (explaining the use of various standards by the lower courts).
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the circuits also have competing views on how those standards should be
applied.28
This Comment examines the application of the two tests adopted by the
circuits to evaluate whether a teacher's speech is protected by the First
Amendment. First, this Comment discusses the origins of the Pickering-
Connick standard and its application by the courts. Next, this Comment
explains the Supreme Court cases from which the Tinker-Hazelwood standard
arose and evaluates its use by the courts. Then it examines a recent
development in student speech jurisprudence and its implications on the
Tinker-Hazelwood standard. Last, this Comment argues that both the
Pickering-Connick standard and the Tinker-Hazelwood standard are inadequate
means of analyzing whether a public school teacher's speech is protected by
the First Amendment. Several commentators have already reached this
conclusion. 29 However, this Comment addresses the issue of the expanding
classroom, a point overlooked by both courts and commentators alike. This
Comment concludes by arguing that the Pickering-Connick standard is an
appropriate means to analyze a teacher's First Amendment rights only if it is
modified to incorporate an objective standard within the first prong of the
analysis.
I. THE SUPREME COURT CASES GIVING RISE TO THE CONFUSION THAT IS
TEACHER FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
The circuits have developed two tests to analyze whether a public school
teacher's classroom speech is protected by the First Amendment. 31 The first
approach, the Pickering-Connick standard, was derived from two Supreme
28. See Daly, supra note 12, at 16-17 (discussing the lack of predictability created by the
circuits in their choice to apply either the Pickering or the Hazelwood standard); Grice, supra
note 12, at 1983, 1985-89 (addressing the courts' use of the two standards in varying ways).
29. Daly, supra note 12, at 1-2 (proposing a balancing test with notice in place of either
standard); Clarick, supra note 12, at 696 (citing both the Hazelwood and the Pickering standards);
Grice, supra note 12, at 1960-61 (stating that neither the Pickering nor the Hazelwood test is
appropriate when evaluating a teacher's in-class rights).
30. Daly, supra note 12, at 51-62 (proposing a balancing test without addressing the
expansion of the classroom); Clarick, supra note 12, at 732-33 (proffering a sophisticated version
of the Pickering analysis without mentioning the expanding classroom); Grice, supra note 12, at
2005 (suggesting a two-part test, consisting of a reasonableness prong and a notice prong, without
noting the additional complications arising from the expanding classroom).
31. Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (E.D. Va. 2006), affd, 484
F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 387 (2007). The two tests have been termed the
Pickering-Connick standard and the Tinker-Hazelwood standard. Id. The same terminology will
be used throughout this Comment. There is arguably a third test used by the Third Circuit. See
Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (alleging that
Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1998) employs a different mode of
analysis than either the Pickering-Connick standard or the Tinker-Hazelwood standard).
However, Edwards involved a state university teacher, as opposed to a public school teacher as
defined in this Comment. Edwards, 156 F.3d at 489.
[Vol. 57:11831188
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Court cases which evaluated the free speech rights of government employees.32
The second approach, the Tinker-Hazelwood standard, also arose from two
Supreme Court cases which analyzed students' rights to free speech under the
First Amendment. 33 It seems logical that courts considering the constitutional
protection afforded to teachers' classroom speech would provide guidance as
to why they choose one test over the other; however, that is not always the
case. Many courts simply begin the analysis without providing a solid
rationale to support the application of one standard over another.
35
Some courts have given a minimal explanation for choosing a particular
standard. For example, one court vaguely stated the teacher was arguing his
First Amendment rights were violated while he was a public employee, so the
court applied the Pickering-Connick standard.36 Another court simply argued
that a teacher's classroom speech is part of the curriculum, and thus the Tinker-
Hazelwood methodology was the appropriate standard to apply.37 The Tenth
Circuit gave the best explanation, stating that the Pickering-Connick standard
32. Lee, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 821 & n.7 (citing Pickering and Connick).
33. Id. at 821 & n.6 (citing Tinker and Hazelwood).
34. See, e.g., Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (beginning
its analysis with the Hazelwood test, only later rationalizing this choice). In deciding what
standard to use, the Miles court started by determining whether the classroom was a public forum.
Id. at 776. The court found that the school had no intention of opening the building for use by the
public, thus maintaining the classroom as a nonpublic forum. Id. Then, the Court analyzed
whether "students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive [the expressive
activities] to bear the imprimatur of the school." Id. The court found that teacher expression
inside the classroom's ordinary framework certainly bears the imprimatur of the school. Id.
Thus, the court stated that it would use the Tinker-Hazelwood standard. Id.
35. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th Cir. 2001) (merely
stating that a teacher is a public employee and then beginning the analysis without providing an
explanation of why it chose the Pickering-Connick standard); Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729,
737 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying the Pickering-Connick standard without addressing the rationale
behind this choice); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998)
(beginning the Pickering-Connick analysis with no explanation of why it chose that standard);
Cliff v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1994) (beginning the analysis, simply by
stating that the speech must be on a matter of public concern without explaining why this
Pickering principle was applicable); Miles, 944 F.2d at 775 ("In determining whether Miles has
satisfied the initial burden of showing his classroom expression is constitutionally protected, we
look to the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood .. "); Cliff v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, No. IP
89-1091-C, 1993 WL 761180, at *5 (S.D. Ind. May 21, 1993) ("In analyzing whether Plaintiff's
speech was protected conduct, the court must first determine whether the 'context, content and
form of [her] statements ... indicate that they were on a matter of public concern."' (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48) (alteration and omission in original)).
36. Lee, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 821-22 ("This case is not about what free speech rights Lee has
as an individual expressing himself on private property. Rather, this case is a question about what
free speech rights Lee has as a public school teacher-employee. Therefore, the Pickering-
Connick standard applies.").
37. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that "a teacher's statements
in class during an instructional period are also part of a curriculum and a regular class activity,"
so the Tinker-Hazelwood standard applied).
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does not account for the special circumstances of the school environment. 38 As
a result, it opted for the Tinker-Hazelwood standard. 39  The difficulty of
analyzing teacher speech does not stop there. Not only are there problems with
both tests, but courts have not adopted a uniform application of their
principles.
A. The Origins of Protecting Government Employees
The Pickering-Connick standard derives primarily from the principles
established by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education.
40
Subsequently, in Connick v. Myers, the Court applied the Pickering principles
to a very different fact pattern: a situation in which a government employee's
speech does not warrant First Amendment protection.
41
In Pickering, the Supreme Court dealt directly with a public school teacher's
42
right to free speech. Marvin Pickering, a public school teacher, wrote a letter
to a local newspaper criticizing the school board for its poor job regarding the
passage of bond issue proposals and its financial allocation decisions,
particularly with regard to the school's athletic programs.4 3 The school board
dismissed Pickering because of the letter and held a hearing on the matter.44
The board ujheld the dismissal,45 finding that Pickering made false statements
in his letter. 6
38. See Miles, 944 F.2d at 777.
39. Id.; see also Daly, supra note 12, at 10 (arguing that "[t]he Pickering line of cases fails
to account for the unique job requirements of public school teachers"); Clarick, supra note 12, at
696 (arguing that existing standards "fail to account for the unique factors at play in the teacher's
role in the education process").
40. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (occurring in the context of a
teacher acting in his capacity as a private citizen).
41. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); see also Lee v. York County Sch. Div.,
418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2006), affd, 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 387 (2007) (explaining that a comparison of the facts in Pickering with the facts in
Connick illustrates the difference between an individual acting as a citizen versus an individual
acting as an employee).
42. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-65.
43. Id. at 566. The Court explained:
The letter constituted, basically, an attack on the School Board's handling of the 1961
bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of financial resources between the
schools' educational and athletic programs. It also charged the superintendent of
schools with attempting to prevent teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing
the proposed bond issue.
Id. The bond issue proposals, and proposed tax increases, were both failed attempts to raise
money to build new schools in the district. Id. at 565-66.
44. Id. at 566.
45. See id. The board was able to dismiss Pickering pursuant to an Illinois statute protecting
"the efficient operation and administration of... schools." Id at 564-65.
46. Id. at 567. One of the false statements alleged was the misrepresentation of money
allocated to athletics. Id. at 572.
1190 [Vol. 57:1183
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Pickering appealed the decision to the state court, claiming his First
Amendment rights had been violated.47 The state court reviewed the decision
on two grounds: (1) whether the school board had sufficient evidence to make
its determination; and (2) whether it could reasonably conclude that
Pickering's letter was detrimental to the schools' interests. 48  The court
dismissed Pickering's First Amendment claim on the basis that his voluntary
acceptance of a teaching position precluded him from making statements
criticizing the administration. 49 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's ruling that Pickering's letter was not constitutionally protected.50 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to evaluate the First Amendment issue.
51
The Court began by stating its consistent rejection of the notion that teachers
relinquish their First Amendment rights by accepting their teaching position.
52
However, the Court acknowledged that the state has a special interest in
regulating a teacher's speech in the classroom that does not apply to citizens in
other environments. 53 In order to account for these conflicting principles, the
Court proffered a balancing test.54  This test balances "the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees. 55
Applying this test, the Court began by examining the statements in the letter
taken as a whole.56 It found that the statements in the letter presented nodanger of causing disorder at the school.57  The Court reasoned that the
47. Id. at 565. Pickering actually claimed violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, invoking the Fourteenth Amendment to make the First Amendment applicable to
the state action. Id.
48. Id. at 567.
49. Id.
50. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (111. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In its
decision, the Supreme Court stated "[i]t is not altogether clear whether the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment had no applicability to appellant's dismissal for writing the letter
in question or whether it determined that the particular statements made in the letter were not
entitled to First Amendment protection." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 567. The Illinois Supreme Court
rejected Pickering's First Amendment claim in one paragraph, echoing the proclamation from the
court below: "By choosing to teach in the public schools, [Pickering] undertook the obligation to
refrain from conduct which in the absence of such position he would have an undoubted right to
engage in." Pickering, 225 N.E.2d at 6.
51. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565. The Court noted probable jurisdiction in regard to
Pickering's constitutional claims. Id.
52. Id. at 568 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952) (holding that
constitutional protections apply to public employees); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
601-02 (1967) (holding that constitutional protections apply in the educational community)).
53. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 569.
57. Id. at 569-70.
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statements were not aimed at any school employee with whom Pickering came
into regular contact while at work.58
Of particular importance, the Court rejected the school board's contention
that Pickering's false statements, regarding funding of athletics, were
detrimental to the operation of the school. 59 The Court highlighted the fact that
Pickering's teaching position did not lend him any more insight into the
allocation of funds than any other taxpayer.60  The letter did not contain
statements to which the public would give extra weight because they came
from someone in a position with a special perspective. 6 1 The subject matter
was not tied tightly to the school's daily affairs, but rather was readi!Xy
available information to which a teacher did not have any unique access.
Furthermore, Pickering disseminated his speech to the public,6 3 and the public
was concerned with the issues he addressed. 64 Thus, the Court concluded that
Pickering's statements were on a matter of public concern and were made in
his capacity as a private citizen.65  Because his employment was only
incidental to his statements, Pickering's speech was constitutionally
protected.66
Fifteen years later, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Pickering.67  In
Connick, Justice White, writing for the Court, began by citing the Pickering
58. Id. The Court alleged that neither discipline by Pickering's superiors nor cohesiveness
with Pickering's colleagues would be in jeopardy as a result of Pickering's letter. Id. at 570. The
Court also noted that the relationship between a teacher and superintendent is not one "for which
it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary [for the
relationship's] proper functioning." 1d.
59. Id. at 572.
60. Id. (noting that the financial figures relating to the athletics program were publicly
accessible).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 574 (explaining that Pickering made a "public communication" rather than a
private one).
64. See id. at 565-66.
65. Id. at 574.
66. Id The Court conducted separate evaluations for Pickering's factually correct
statements and his factually incorrect statements. Id. at 570-71. in both cases, the Court found
that his statements were not detrimental to the operation of the school. Id. The Court noted that
to hold the false statements to be per se detrimental to the school would be "to equate the Board
members' own interests with that of the school['s]." Id. at 571.
67. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-46 (1983).
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holding. Yet Connick did not involve a teacher at all. Rather, the
respondent was an Assistant District Attorney named Sheila Myers.70 Myers
was informed that she was going to be transferred to a different department of
7'criminal prosecution, which she adamantly opposed. In fact, Myers was so
infuriated by the situation that she created a survey for her co-workers that
included, among other things, questions regarding the transfer policy and the
general office attitude. 72  After Myers disseminated the survey, Myers's
supervisor fired her, citing "refusal to attempt the transfer" and
"insubordination" as the reasons for her termination. 73 Myers sued in federal
court, alleging that her First Amendment rights had been violated.74
Myers prevailed in district court.75 Based on the evidence presented, the
court found that Myers was fired as a direct result of distributing the survey.
76
Next, the court held that the issues contained in the survey were on matters of
public concern because they addressed the operation of the district attorney's
office.7 7 Therefore, the court held that disseminating the survey was a
78
constitutionally protected exercise of expression. The court of appeals
68. Id. at 140. Justice White wrote:
[W]e stated that a public employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights to
comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment. We also
recognized that the State's interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees "differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general." The problem . . . was arriving "at a balance
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of a
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees."
Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568) (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Myers appealed to numerous superiors, but was rebuffed. Id at 140-41. Further,
she was told that "her concerns were not shared by others in the office." Id. at 141.
72. Id. at 141. The "questionnaire ... concern[ed] office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work in political campaigns." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 760 (E.D. La. 1981).
76. Id. at 755.
77. Id. at 758.
78. Id. at 759.
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affirmed the district court's ruling,79 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.8o
The Supreme Court began its discussion with a brief history of the Court's
evolving position on public employee First Amendment rights. 81  The Court
concluded this discussion by noting that "speech on public issues occupies the
"'highest rung of the [hierarchy] of First Amendment values."' ' 82 Based on
the Court's precedent, if Myers's speech was not considered to be a matter of
public concern, then there would be no need for the Court to evaluate the
reasons behind her termination.
83
To determine whether the speech regarded a matter of public concern, the
Court evaluated the statements taken as a whole, focusing on the form, context,
and content.84 The Court defined a matter of public concern as "any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community." 85  It then rejected the
notion that the matters contained in Myers's survey were of public concern.
86
The Court noted that Myers did not intend to distribute her information to the
79. Myers v. Connick, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court decision without rendering its own opinion, which is
permissible in the Fifth Circuit under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Perimeter Park Inv.
Assocs. v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 150-51 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting the Fifth Circuit
rule that a court may affirm without an opinion if "'no error of law appears."' (quoting 5TH CIR.
R. 21)).
80. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
81. Id. at 143-45 (discussing the Court's move away from subjecting public employees to
harsh constitutional violations based on their positions as government employees).
82. Id. at 145 (quoting NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)
(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))).
83. Id. at 146. The Court held that "government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment" when the speech is not on a matter of public concern. Id However, the Court
limited its holding by conceding that speech on a matter of private concern is still afforded some
constitutional protection. Id. at 147. The Court stated:
We do not suggest, however, that Myers' speech, even if not touching upon a matter of
public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment .... We hold
only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in
reaction to the employee's behavior.
Id.
84. Id. at 147-48.
85. Id. at 146.
86. Id. at 143. The Court stated that "[tihe District Court got off on the wrong foot ... by
initially finding that . . . 'the issues presented in the questionnaire relate[d] to the effective
functioning of the District Attorney's Office and are matters of public importance and concern."'
Id. (quoting Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D. La. 1981)). However, the Court
found that one of the questions in the survey was on a matter of public concern. Id. at 149. The
Court then performed a balancing test, which resulted in the finding that the question "touched
upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense ...." Id. at 154.
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public, but rather to stir controversy in the office relating to a personal
matter. 87 As a result, the Court held that the survey was not constitutionally
protected.
88
B. Pickering and Connick Go to School
When dealing with the issue of whether a public school teacher's speech is
constitutionally protected, several circuits have applied the rules established in
Pickering and Connick.89 These courts begin by asking if the speech was on a
matter of public concern. 90 If the speech is not on a matter of public concern,
the First Amendment claim fails. If the speech is on a matter of public
concern, a First Amendment violation will be found if the interest in speaking
exceeds the state's interest in maintaining the effective functioning of the
92services the state conducts by restricting the speech. At first glance, this
analysis seems relatively straightforward, but a closer reading of the reported
decisions uncovers major problems with this methodology.
The question of whether speech is on a matter of public concern can be
difficult to answer and the courts have not settled on a single definition of
"public concern. 93 The Fifth Circuit noted this problem94 and, therefore, did
not attempt to define the term. 95 Instead, the court simply analogized the facts
to previous determinations of what constituted a matter of public concern.
96
Some courts avoid attempting to define the term at all and, instead, just begin
the analysis.97
87. Id. at 148. The Court found that the questionnaire "reflect[ed] one employee's
dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause c~l~bre." Id.
88. Id. at 154.
89. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 230 (6th Cir. 2005) (beginning
the inquiry of whether the speech is protected by asking if the speech touched on a matter of
public concern); Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that the first step
in the analysis is that "the employee must show that her speech touched on matters of public
concern").
91. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989)
(noting that private speech warrants no First Amendment protection).
92. See Evans-Marshall, 428 F.3d at 229 (explaining that in order to enjoy constitutional
protection, the plaintiff must have an interest in speaking that outweighs the school's interest in
restricting the speech); Leary, 228 F.3d at 737 (stating that the "employee's interest 'in
commenting upon matters of public concern' must be found to outweigh 'the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees' for it to be afforded First Amendment protection).
93. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 798.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 789-99.
97. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1998)
(stating that an employment dispute affords no First Amendment protection if it does not
constitute a matter of public concern); Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682
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When courts do attempt to define the term, the difficulty becomes apparent.
For example, when trying to clarify the matter, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit asked: "[W]as it the employee's point to bring wrongdoing to
light? Or to raise other issues of public concern, because they are of public
concern? Or was the point to further some purely private interest?" Yet, the
court stated that the teacher's motive is not dispositive on the question of
whether the speech is on a matter of public concern.99 The court then noted
that a teacher's private speech does not become a matter of public concern
merely because the public will be interested in the topic.100  To determine
whether the teacher was speaking as an angry employee or as a citizen, the
court decided it was necessary to look "deeper into the precise content, form,
and context of [the] speech."'' 1  Although the court finally came to a
conclusion, °2 its sporadic methodology illustrates the need for a clearer
definition of what constitutes "a matter of public concern."
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia took a different
approach. In Lee v. York County School Division, William Lee was the
Spanish teacher in a public high school. 10 3  Lee posted materials on his
classroom walls, some of which had a religious theme. 10 4 While he was sick
and away from the school, the principal received complaints regarding the
religious material, went into Lee's classroom, and removed the material.
10 5
Lee subsequently brought a claim in district court alleging that his First
Amendment rights had been violated. 
106
Before providing any guidance as to what constitutes speech on a matter of
public concern, the court held that curricular speech never constitutes a matter
of public concern.10 7 The court provided an extremely broad definition of
curricular speech: curricular speech is all expressive activity "supervised by
F.2d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 1982) (beginning the analysis with factors taken into account by the
Pickering Court when it balanced the competing interests without defining a matter of public
concern); see also Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1986) (stating that a matter of
public concern does not turn on the degree of public interest, but defining a matter of public
concern no further).
98. Cliff v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
99. Id.
100. Idat4ll.
101. Id. at410.
102. Id. The court concluded: "Consideration of the Connick factors here convinces us that
the district court correctly characterized Cliffs speech as merely of private rather than public
concern." Id.
103. Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 819 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 484
F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 387 (2007).
104. Id. at 820.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 822-24. The court held that "curricular speech fails per se to be a matter of public
concern." Id. at 824.
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faculty members and designed to impart knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences [as well as] teaching methodology."',0 8 The court
pointed out that these activities do not have to take place in the ordinary
classroom so long as they impart knowledge to the students. 10 9 The court
explained that the definition of curricular speech includes teaching
methodology because a teaching method is merely the manner in which the
teacher fulfills his obligation as an employee.' 10 Using this approach, the court
found that the petitioner's religious materials were curricular speech."' The
court stated that because Lee used these materials to catch the students'
attention to teach them Spanish, the materials were part of his teaching
methodology and were thus afforded no First Amendment protection."12
The court did not end its discussion there, however. It also found that Lee's
speech was not constitutionally protected because it failed to satisfy the first
prong of Pickering, as the speech was not on a matter of public concern." 3
The four factors evaluated by the court in Lee were: (1) whether the speech
was expressed in public or in the workplace; (2) whether it was addressed to
the public; (3) whether the speech was intended to be political or a matter of
public interest; and (4) whether the speech was in a public debate regarding a
precise issue.1 14 Taking these factors into account, the court quickly dismissed
Lee's argument that his expression was on a matter of public concern."
5
Both the Cliff and Lee courts provide examples of the difficulty in
attempting to define what is a matter of public concern. However, the
difficulty is not insurmountable. Several courts rely on the definition provided
in Connick.116 Defining a matter of public concern as "any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, ' 17 is one way of addressing this
challenge. This definition allows courts to take issues into consideration that
108. Id. at 825.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 826-27.
111. Id. at 825.
112. Id. at 826-27.
113. Id. at 827-28. See also, e.g., Cliff v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir.
1994) (beginning the analysis with whether the speech was on a matter of public concern).
114. Lee, 418F. Supp. 2dat828.
115. Id at 829. The court held: "Not only does an analysis of all of these factors reveal that
there is no genuine dispute that Lee's speech was not a matter of public concern, but there is no
genuine dispute that each individual factor requires a finding for Defendants." Id at 828.
116. Roberts v. Newark Pub. Sch., 232 F. App'x 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (using the definition
of "political, social, or other concern to the community"); accord Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ.,
428 F.3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying the same definition found in Connick); Cockrel v.
Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050-51 (6th Cir. 2001); Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d
729, 737 (6th Cir. 2000).
117. Connickv. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); see also supra note 116.
1197
Catholic University Law Review
are,118 or might become,1 19 important to the community on a case-by-case
basis. 10 Further, the size of the community is not limited by adopting this
definition; it can either be on a local or on a national scale.
121
Once the court surmounts the hurdle of deciding whether the speech is on a
matter of public concern, the Pickering-Connick balancing test works well.
For example, in Cockrel v. Shelby County School District, the court found that
inviting advocates of the environmental benefits of industrial hemp 122 into the
classroom constituted speech. 123 Further, it held the speech was on a matter of
public concern because the community of Kentucky was concerned with
industrial hemp at the time. 124 The school claimed it had significant interests
in restricting the speech, namely loyalty, efficiency in school operation, and
workplace harmony. 25  The court found these interests to be significantly
impacted by inviting the advocates into the classroom to speak. 126 Despite the
school's interests, the court ultimately held that the teacher's speech was
protected because the school initially approved the speakers' invitation into the
classroom.127 This holding demonstrates that Pickering-Connick balancing can
118. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1050-51 (concluding that speaking about industrial hemp is a
matter of public concern to some citizens of Kentucky).
119. Connick, 461 U.S. at 164 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court stated:
[W]hether a government employee's speech is of"public concern" must be determined
by reference to the broad conception of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech found necessary by the Framers "to supply the public need for information and
education with respect to the significant issues of the times . . . . Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period."
Id (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
120. See, e.g.,supranotes 118-19.
121. Compare Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1051 (finding speech was important to the community of
Kentucky), with Evans-Marshall, 428 F.3d at 231 (holding that themes of race and justice in the
American South are clearly matters of public concern).
122. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1041-42. The presentations at issue were conducted by Woody
Harrelson, members of the Kentucky Hemp Museum, members of the Kentucky Hemp Growers
Cooperative Association, and foreign hemp growers. Id. These speeches promoted the use of
industrial hemp in place of increased logging efforts, which presumably would be better for the
environment. See id. at 1042.
123. Id. at 1050.
124. Id. at 1052. Kentucky law prohibited possession of industrial hemp, even though it has
properties that permit it to be developed into a valuable fiber. Id. at 1042 (citing KY. REV. STAT.
§§ 218A. 1422, 218A.0 10(14) (2007)); see also supra note 3.
125. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1053.
126. Id. at 1054 (noting that the plaintiff created difficulties with maintenance of the school's
efficiency and harmony by inviting the industrial hemp advocates).
127. Id. at 1054-55; see also Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 231 (6th Cir.
2005) ("[W]e cannot allow [concerns of harmony, efficiency, and discipline] to tilt the Pickering
scale in favor of the government ... when the disruptive consequences of the employee speech
can be traced back to the government's express decision permitting the employee to engage in
that speech." (quoting Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1054-55) (alteration in original)).
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be used effectively,' 28 particularly because the Cockrel court recognized that
the school's proffered interests for restricting the teacher's speech were merely
a pretext. 129  This case illustrates that courts can use Pickering-Connick
balancing to account for unfounded bases for regulating a teacher's speech.
C. Black Armbands, Protected-School Newspaper, Unprotected. The Origins
of Analyzing Student Speech
The case that set the standard for evaluating a student's free speech rights in
the classroom is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.130  Tinker involved three high school students during the Vietnam
War era.131 The students gathered with several other community members in
one of the student's homes and decided to wear black armbands to school until
New Year's Day in protest of the conflict. 132 The students' school learned of
the plan, and implemented a policy of suspending anyone who wore an
armband to school. 133 The suspension would last until the suspended student
came to school without wearing an armband. 134 The three students disobeyed,
were suspended, and did not return until the planned protest was over. 135 The
students brought a claim in district court alleging that their First Amendment
rights had been violated. 136 The district court dismissed the claim, ruling that
the school's policy was constitutional because it prevented a disturbance in
school. 137
In reviewing the ruling, the Supreme Court originated the well-known
phrase of student free speech jurisprudence: "It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
128. See Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 738 (6th Cir. 2000) (conducting the Pickering
balancing test and finding that the teacher's speech was a matter of great public concern and it
outweighed the school's interest in efficient functioning).
129. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1054. The court stated:
We are troubled by the fact that, whereas school officials gave plaintiff prior approval
to host all three of the industrial hemp presentations at issue in this case, defendants
now forward concerns of school efficiency and harmony as reasons supporting their
decision to discharge Cockrel .. . . We do not believe that defendants can use the
outcry within the school community protesting Cockrel's speech, speech that was
approved by school officials in advance, as a shield for their decision to discharge her.
Id.
130. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
13 1. Id. at 504. Two of the petitioners were in high school, and the third was in junior high
school. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 504-05.
137. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
without rendering an opinion. Id. at 505. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
1199
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expression at the schoolhouse gate.''138 However, the Court recognized that the
school is a unique environment that requires the state and its officials to give
special attention to the maintenance of discipline. 139 The Court coined the
well-settled First Amendment notion that "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression., 140 It then wrote that the state must show that a policy restricting
speech is justified by something more than mere fear of others disliking a
minority viewpoint. The Court held that for a school to prohibit speech, it
must be able to show that the speech will "materially and substantially disrupt
the work and discipline of the school. 142  Because the Court found no
evidence that the protest would cause any disruption, it ruled in favor of the
students.
143
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,144 decided almost twenty years
after Tinker, provides the second piece of the Tinker-Hazelwood standard. The
dispute in Hazelwood arose from three high school students' participation in
the publication of their school's newspaper.145 The newspaper was the product
of a journalism class that received funds from both newspaper sales and the
school board's budget. 146 Before publication of each issue, the school's policy
was for the journalism teacher to provide the principal with a copy of each
article that was to be included in the issue. 147 Three days before printing the
issue that caused the controversy, the principal was given the articles that were
to be published. 148 The principal disapproved of two of the articles because he
believed they were "inappropriate for some of the younger students."'
149
Because the deadline for printing was near, the journalism teacher printed the
138. Id. at 506.
139. Id. at 507 ("[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.").
140. Id. at 508.
141. Id. at 509. A state "must be able to show that its action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint." Id.
142. Id. at 513.
143. Id. at 514.
144. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
145. Id. at 262.
146. Id. at 262-63.
147. Id. at 263.
148. Id.
149. Id. One of the articles described a few Hazelwood students' pregnancies. Id. Although
the names were changed in the text, the principal feared that the students might be recognized by
the content of the article. Id. The second article dealt with divorce and its effects on Hazelwood
students. Id. The principal objected to this article because the newspaper staff did not provide
the parents of one student, who was referenced by name, the opportunity to consent to the
article's publication. Id.
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issue without the two articles to which the principal objected: this gave rise to
the students' claim that their First Amendment rights were violated.
The Supreme Court began its review of the students' First Amendment
argument by analyzing whether the school was a public forum, which is
created proactively by opening the premises for use by the entire general
public or a segment of it. 51 When a public forum is not created, schools may
constitutionally impose reasonable speech restrictions. 15 Finding no intention
to create a public forum, the Court distinguished the facts before it from
Tinker.153 The Court noted that the case essentially required a determination of
whether the school is required to promote its students' speech. 154 It ruled that
the school need not promote certain speech, namely, expressive activities that
"the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."
155
The Court held that schools can restrict speech constitutionally "by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so lon6g as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'
5
D. Student Speech Meets Teacher Speech
Some circuits have taken the principles from Tinker and Hazelwood and
applied them to the First Amendment analysis of the protections afforded to a
teacher's classroom speech. 157 For example, Miles v. Denver Public Schools
involved a teacher's First Amendment claim against the school district for its
decision to place the teacher on administrative leave, based on his in-class
statements.158  Miles's comments involved a rumor that students were
engaging in sexual activity on the playground during recess. 159 In analyzing
the claim, the court combined the principles of Tinker and Hazelwood:
150. Id. at 263-64. The teacher believed that his only options were either to print an
abridged version of the paper or not to print one at all because the school year was coming to an
end. Id. Thus, he opted for the former. Id. at 264.
151. Id. at267.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 270-71 (noting that unlike Tinker, where the question regarded a school's
toleration of student speech, the issue in Hazelwood was whether a school was affirmatively
required to promote student speech).
154. Id.
155. Id. at271.
156. Id. at 273.
157. See supra note 18.
158. Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 774 (10th Cir. 1991).
159. Id. The questionable comment was made in response to a request that Miles provide an
example of his contention that there was a decline in school quality. Id. Referring to an
unsubstantiated rumor, Miles said, "I don't think in 1967 you would have seen two students
making out on the tennis court." Id. Miles first heard the rumor from a fellow teacher who was
told the story by two students alleging that they saw the incident. Id.
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Although the Court emphasized that "students in the public schools
do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,"' the Court held that educators
do not offend the first amendment by exercising editorial control
over school-sponsored expression "so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'16
The Miles court began its analysis as the Supreme Court did in Hazelwood by
asking whether the school was a public forum.1 61 Because the school did not
affirmatively o 2en itself for public debate, the court found that it was not a
public forum. Next, the court determined that the school had legitimate
pedagogical concerns in regulating Miles's speech: it had (1) an interest in
precluding Miles from using his position to circulate a rumor; (2) an interest in
employee professionalism; and (3) an interest in providing a sound learning163
environment. The court then examined whether the actions taken against
Miles were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests, finding that
they were. 164 As a result, the court held that it would not interfere with the
school's administration of its affairs.
165
Likewise, the First Circuit adopted a similar approach in Ward v. Hickey;
166
however, it added the additional safeguard that notice be given to the
teacher. 167  Toby Ward's teaching job was not renewed after she had a
dialogue with her students concerning the abortion of fetuses with Down's
syndrome. 168 Ward claimed that her First Amendment rights had been
violated, alleging that she was not reappointed to her teaching position in
retaliation for her classroom discussion. 169 After Ward lost her claim in district
court, 170 the appellate court began its review by reiterating Tinker's general
principle that teachers have a right of free speech in the classroom.' The
court then stated the caveat that schools may limit expression, provided the
160. 1d. at 775 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))).
161. Id. at 776; see also Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) (starting with the
public forum inquiry and holding that the classroom is not a public forum); Williams v. Vidmar,
367 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (beginning the analysis with a determination of
whether a public forum was created and stating that "[t]he key to the holding in Hazelwood is its
discussion of the importance of determining whether the expression allegedly being interfered
with is being made in a public forum or a nonpublic forum.").
162. Miles, 944 F.2d at 776.
163. Id. at 778.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 779.
166. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
167. Id. at 452 (adding a notice prong to the Tinker-Hazelwood standard).
168. Id. at 450.
169. Id.
170. Id. at451.
171. Id. at452.
[Vol. 57:11831202
2008] Protecting Public School Teachers' First Amendment Rights
reason for the limitation is to promote scholastic goals. The court articulated
the Tinker-Hazelwood standard: "[W]e find that a school committee may
regulate a teacher's classroom speech if: (1) the regulation is reasonably
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern; and (2) the school provided the
teacher with notice of what conduct was prohibited." 173  The notice
requirement is meant to prevent the chilling effect that can arise from not
knowing what conduct is prohibited and what conduct is permitted.
174
In addition to the chilling effect problem, numerous interests may be
considered legitimate pedagogical concerns, which has the potential to
severely diminish a teacher's First Amendment rights. For example, the
plaintiff in Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free School District was
reprimanded as a consequence of his lecture regarding the persistence of vision
phenomenon. 176  In order to illustrate the phenomenon, the plaintiff
disseminated 35mmpictures, one of which depicted a birth scene containing a
bare-chested lady. 77  In rendering its opinion, the court merely stated that
"school officials had a legitimate pedagogical purpose in restricting the display
of photographs of bare-chested women in a tenth-grade classroom."' 178 It did
not offer any precise explanation of why the school had a legitimate
pedagogical purpose, aside from stating that the picture was unnecessary for
the presentation.1 79 The court's scant reasoning illustrates that a school does
not need to offer much of a policy reason for a court to find that the school has
an interest in restricting a particular viewpoint. Were it otherwise, the
Silano court would have explained the rationale behind its holding that the
school had a pedagogical purpose for restricting the picture.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citations omitted); see also Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 23
(1st Cir. 1999) (adding the notice requirement to the Tinker-Hazelwood standard); Lacks v.
Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 723 (8th Cir. 1998) (same).
174. Ward, 996 F.2d at 453 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)).
175. Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994).
The plaintiff in this case was a guest lecturer at a public school. Id. at 721. Despite the plaintiff's
status, the court stated that he was "entitled to no more deference than a trained education
professional." Id. at 723. The court used the same analysis it would have used if the plaintiff had
been a teacher. Id.
176. Id. at 721. Persistence of vision is "the retention of a visual image for a short period of
time after the removal of the stimulus that produced it: the phenomenon that produces the illusion
of movement when viewing motion pictures." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2001).
177. Silano,42 F.3d at 721.
178. Id. at723.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., id. The court concluded: "Given that the disputed film clip was entirely
unnecessary to the subject matter of [the] lecture, the school officials had a legitimate pedagogical
purpose in restricting the display of photographs of bare-chested women in a tenth-grade
classroom." Id.
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E. "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"
Recently the Supreme Court dealt a blow to students' free speech rights.
Morse v. Frederick involved the now infamous banner bearing the phrase
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 1 81 Joseph Frederick was a student at an Alaskan
high school that permitted its students to leave class so they could witness the
Olympic torch relay pass through town.' 82 On the day of the relay, Frederick
did not make it to school because of car trouble.!8 3 In fact, he never set foot on
school grounds prior to the torch relay. 84 However, Frederick was able to get
to the sidewalk across the street from his school where several of his friends
were positioned to watch the torch pass. 85 As the camera crews were filming
the torch pass by, Frederick displayed a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" in order to attract media attention.' 86  The school principal
immediately crossed the street and confiscated the banner. 187  She then
suspended Frederick for ten days in accordance with a school policy banning
any expression that "advocates the use of substances that are illegal to
minors."'
188
The Supreme Court held that a school may constitutionally restrict speech at
a school-sponsored event if the speech can reasonably be perceived as
promoting illegal drug use.' 8 9 Before beginning its analysis, the Court quickly
dismissed Frederick's argument that the case was not a student speech case
because he was on a sidewalk at the time he displayed the banner.' Next, the
Court noted that schools have a compelling interest in regulating illegal drug
use.19 1 It then stated that this interest, in addition to the special circumstances
of the school environment, provides schools with the authority to "restrict
student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug
use."'19 2 As the Court wrote, schools do not need to tolerate expression that
contributes to the dangers of promoting illegal drug use at school events.
93
This means that a school can enact a constitutionally-sound policy restricting a
181. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007). This banner has gained so much
popularity that the Newseum, a museum focusing on news located in Washington, D.C., wants to
acquire it. Museums Seek Banner at Crux of Legal Battle, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 7,
2007, at BI. The Newseum intends to put it next to Mary Beth Tinker's black arrnband that was
involved in the Tinker case. Id. at B2.
182. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
183. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
184. Brief for the Respondent at 2, Morse v. Frederick, No. 06-278 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007).
185. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2622-23 (quoting Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520).
189. Id. at 2624-25.
190. Id. at 2624.
191. Id. at2628.
192. Id. at 2629.
193. Id.
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viewpoint it finds unacceptable, provided it has a compelling interest in doing
so. The school can also reprimand a student who reasonably was perceived to
have articulated that viewpoint.
In a sweeping concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority
opinion only because it diminished the standard set forth in Tinker.194 Justice
Thomas vouched for the doctrine of in loco parentis, which essentially
provides the school with complete control over the regulation of student
conduct and speech.
195
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he stated that the decision
"does serious violence to the First Amendment in upholding-indeed, lauding-a
school's decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it
disagreed.' ' 96  Justice Stevens quoted Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia197 to assert that viewpoint discrimination is the most
blatant form of First Amendment violation, and therefore, subject to the
strictest burden.' 98 Also, he noted that punishing a viewpoint that promotes
unlawful activity is constitutional only if the speech is likely to cause the
unlawful conduct the government seeks to prohibit.' 99 Justice Stevens argued
that the majority's decision violated both of these well-established First
Amendment principles.
200
II. THE TROUBLE CAUSED BY "BONG HITS 4 JESUS": UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES FOR TEACHER SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Morse diminished the free speech rights of students by carving out an
exception to the First Amendment rights protected by Tinker.2 0 1 Morse has
significant unintended consequences for teacher free speech rights under the
Tinker-Hazelwood standard, and further illustrates an enormous problem in the
analysis. The Tinker-Hazelwood standard normally begins with a discussion of
whether the speech was made in a public forum.2 °2 However, some courts
194. Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 2635. Justice Thomas summed the doctrine's main points as follows:
(1) [U]nder in loco parentis, speech rules and other school rules were treated
identically; (2) the in loco parentis doctrine imposed almost no limits on the types of
rules that a school could set while students were in school; and (3) schools and teachers
had tremendous discretion in imposing punishments for violations of those rules.
Id.
196. Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995).
198. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
828-29).
199. Id. at 2645.
200. Id. at 2644-46.
201. See, e.g., id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
202. See, e.g., Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("The key
to the holding in Hazelwood is its discussion of the importance of determining whether the
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have completely disregarded this portion of the test.203  Further, the Morse
Court limited the circumstances in which a student is considered to be in a
public forum. In Morse, Frederick was on a public sidewalk at the time of his
speech.204 Public streets have consistently been held to be public forums,
20 5
yet the Court held that Frederick was at a school event, subject to greater
speech restrictions. 206 These two facts-the courts disregarding a vital part of
the analysis and the Morse Court diminishing the scope of what constitutes a
public forum-present a dangerous situation for teachers because they expand
the classroom tremendously under the Tinker-Hazelwood standard.20 7
The Morse Court ignored other relevant facts in determining whether the
speech occurred in a public forum.20 8 The parties involved and the courts that
heard the case disagreed on whether permitting the students to watch the
Olympic torch relay was a school-sponsored event. 209 The Ninth Circuit took
Frederick's side, 21 while the Supreme Court agreed with Morse.21 However,
the evidence showed, without contradiction, that the event was not
expression allegedly being interfered with is being made in a public forum or a nonpublic
forum.").
203. See, e.g., Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1999)
(beginning the analysis without evaluating whether the speech was made in a public forum);
Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722-24 (2d Cir. 1994)
(failing to examine whether the statements were made in a public forum).
204. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
205. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988) ("[Olur decisions identifying public
streets and sidewalks as traditional public fora are not accidental invocations of a 'cliche,' but
recognition that '[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public."' (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939))).
206. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
207. Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (holding that a
school can be a public forum if it opens itself up to the public), with Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629
(holding that school-sponsored activities that take place in a public forum may be subject to
school speech restrictions).
208. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006)
(acknowledging that there were genuine disputes of fact concerning the nature of the relay,
ultimately dismissing them as immaterial).
209. See infra notes 210-11.
210. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1115 ("Coca-Cola and other private sponsors supported a
'Winter Olympics Torch Relay' in Juneau, Alaska."); Brief for the Respondent, supra note 184,
at 1 ("Coca-Cola and local businesses sponsored the relay."); James Kilpatrick, 'Bong Hits for
Jesus' was the Worst Ruling of the Year, OLYMPIAN (Washington), July 3, 2007, at A6 ("The
school turned out a small band, but that was the beginning and end of the school's
involvement."); Op-Ed, Justices Missed the Point of Teen's Banner, THE MORNING CALL
(Pennsylvania), June 28, 2007, at A12 ("The relay was sponsored by Coca-Cola, not the
school.").
211. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (stating that Frederick unfurled the banner "[a]t a school-
sanctioned and school-supervised event"); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Morse v. Frederick,
No. 06-278 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2007) (Noting that "Respondent insist[s] that the factual record
supports a finding that this is a 'speech on a public sidewalk' case rather than a 'student speech'
case. They are wrong.").
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mandatory, 21 and that Frederick arrived late to the relay, never setting foot on
school grounds that day.213  Further, the Court's assertion that the event
happened during school hours is also debatable.2 14 One commentator argued
that school was not in session at the time.21 5 Even if it is conceded that was in
session at the time of the relay, students were not being supervised in the
traditional school manner.216  These disputable facts illustrate the Court's
willingness to find that an event is school-sponsored when there is a
controversy.
Was Frederick really a student at the time? The facts certainly are not
convincing that he was, and at least one commentator agrees that he was not.
217
What if Frederick lived across the street from the school, never came to school
on the day of the relay, and unfurled the banner from his window without ever
stepping foot outside of his home? Nothing stops the Court from finding that
Frederick would be a student in that situation, and this is problematic. The
Tinker-Hazelwood standard provides no safeguards for teachers in this
situation. After determining if the speech takes place in a public forum, a step
that some courts bypass completely, the standard provides that a school can
212. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 ("Students were allowed to leave class to observe the relay
.. (emphasis added)); Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116 ("[S]tudents filed affidavits saying that
they were just released, not required to stay together or with their teachers .... " (emphasis
added)); Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *1 (D. Alaska May
29, 2003), vacated by, 439 F.3d 1114 (2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) ("Students at JDHS
were permitted to leave their classes to watch the relay from the sidewalk outside the school."
(emphasis added)); Brief for the Respondent, supra note 184, at 1 ("Teachers at JDHS were
permitted to release their students from class to witness the Olympic flame travel past the high
school." (emphasis added)); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 211, at 3 ("[T]he Juneau School
District allowed students to observe and participate in the ceremony." (emphasis added)).
213. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (conceding that Frederick came late to school and "[w]hen he
arrived, he joined his friends... across the street from the school to watch the event"); Frederick,
439 F.3d at 1115 ("Frederick... never made it to school that morning because he got stuck in the
snow in his driveway, but he made it to the sidewalk, across from the school .... ); Frederick,
2003 WL 25274689, at *I (noting that Frederick "arrived at school late and immediately joined
his friends to watch the event, across the street from [the school]").
214. Cf Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
215. Kilpatrick, supra note 210 (alleging that Frederick's school was not in session and
students "were free to watch the parade, throw snowballs or stay home, as they wished").
216. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116 ("[S]tudents filed affidavits saying that they were just
released, not required to stay together or with their teachers, except for the gym class, and school
administrators did not attempt to stop students who got bored and left."); Brief for the
Respondent, supra note 184, at 34 ("Except for members of the school pep band, cheerleaders,
and one gym class, students were not required to remain together and some students apparently
took advantage of the occasion to leave for the day ... ").
217. See Kilpatrick, supra note 210 ("Not a single class was in session as the torch passed
by.").
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limit school-sponsored expression2 18 or classroom speech.219 As seen in
Morse, courts are willing to find that functions are school-sponsored, even
when the functions are not truly sponsored by the school.220 This extends the
classroom even further, which presents a danger for teachers.
221
Moreover, because of the aftermath of Morse, under the Tinker-Hazelwood
standard, teachers are now at the "mercy of the varied understanding of [their]
hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to [their]
intent and meaning." 222  Justice Stevens argued persuasively in his Morse
dissent: "[I]t is one thing to restrict speech that advocates drug use. It is
another thing entirely to prohibit an obscure message with a drug theme that a
third party subjectively-and not very reasonably-thinks is tantamount to
express advocacy." 223 There are always a few selected students who dislike
their teachers. Teachers are now subject to angry students' perceptions of what
the teachers say or express, or the students' biased opinions and the spin that
the students put on the teachers' speech.
Lastly, the Court leaves open the possibility of creating more exceptions to
Tinker, which is particularly unsettling to the application of the Tinker-
Hazelwood standard. Creating exceptions to Tinker, in the manner that the
Morse Court did, violates a fundamental concept of the First Amendment: "the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 224  In Morse, the school's
interest was deterring illegal drug use by students. 225  The school had an
established policy in place that barred any expression advocating illegal
226
substance use. It is valid to argue that schools always have an interest in
deterring illegal activity. However, what if abortion becomes illegal? Under
218. Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Hazelwood).
219. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993). "It is well-settled that public
schools may limit classroom speech to promote educational goals." Id (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)).
220. See supra note 208-11 and accompanying text.
221. See Op-Ed, supra note 210, at A 12 (noting that Morse "allows schools to reach beyond
the schoolhouse gate").
222. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2648 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens discussed the Court's constitutional obligations:
To the extent the Court defers to the principal's ostensibly reasonable judgment, it
abdicates its constitutional responsibility. The beliefs of third parties, reasonable or
otherwise, have never dictated which messages amount to proscribable advocacy.
Indeed, it would be a strange constitutional doctrine that would allow the prohibition of
only the narrowest category of speech advocating unlawful conduct, yet would permit a
listener's perceptions to determine which speech deserved constitutional protection.
Id. at 2647-48 (citation and footnote omitted).
223. Id. at 2646 (emphasis in original).
224. Id. at 2645. Justice Stevens wrote that this concept "is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment .. " Id.
225. Id. at 2628 (majority opinion).
226. Id. at 2623 (referencing Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520).
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the Tinker-Hazelwood standard, a school could potentially ban any expression
with an obscure reference to promoting abortion. As seen in Silano, the
Second Circuit would have no problem upholding a ban on the promotion of an
illegal abortion, and may not provide a rationale regarding the school's
legitimate pedagogical purpose for the restriction.
227
These three problematic issues: (1) the expanding classroom due to the
disintegration of the public forum analysis and the willingness to find events
school-sponsored; (2) putting the teacher at the mercy of his students; and (3)
the possibility for viewpoint discrimination, are illustrative of the inadequacies
of the Tinker-Hazelwood standard in the teacher speech analysis.
III. A DIFFERENT Focus PROVIDES CLARITY: OBJECTIVITY AVOIDS
COMPLEXITY
The Pickering-Connick standard provides a solid basis for analyzing teacher
speech. However, the lower courts have focused on the wrong words of the
test.228 The beginning of the analysis should be a determination of whether the
teacher is an employee or a citizen at the time of the speech, not whether the
expression is on a matter of public concern. This can be done objectively by
adopting a principle of labor law concerning the validity of no-solicitation
rules.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has interpreted the National
Labor Relations Act229 (NLRA) in a manner useful to the present inquiry. The
NLRB has made a distinction between "company time" and "working time." 230
The NLRB stated that the NLRA "does not prevent an employer from making
and enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company
time. Working time is for work. 2 3 1 Based on this proposition, the NLRB
concluded that it was impermissible for an employer to regulate an employee's
conduct outside of working time, including lunch and break periods. The
227. Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir.
1994) (providing no explanation for why the school had a legitimate pedagogical purpose in
censoring pictures of bare-chested women).
228. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
229. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (2000).
230. In re Peyton Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943).
231. Id. (addressing the validity of an employer's no-solicitation rule).
232. Id. ("[T]ime outside working hours ... is an employee's time to use as he wishes
without unreasonable restraint .. "); see also NLRB v. Ertel Mfg. Corp., 352 F.2d 916, 920 (7th
Cir. 1965) ("It is well established that an employer's rule which bars union solicitation by
employees during non-working time or distribution of union literature during non-working time
in non-working areas, in the absence of unusual circumstances, violates ... the Act."); NLRB v.
Miller, 341 F.2d 870, 873 (2d Cir. 1965) (enforcing the Board's order for the employer to "cease
and desist from promulgating or enforcing a rule prohibiting solicitation during nonworking time
... [i]n the absence of any special circumstances"); 48A AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations
§ 1436 (2005) ("An employer unlawfully interferes with the protected rights of employees by
promulgating and enforcing a rule that precludes employees from engaging in union solicitation
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interest that the NLRB was protecting was primarily the employer's production
interest.233  The Court found that this interest was not furthered when the
employee is outside of working time or on a lunch or break period.234 Taking
this principle into account, courts can objectively determine whether a teacher
is an employee or a citizen at the time he is engaged in expressive activities.
The "production interest" that a school has as an employer is molding
students to become individuals with different qualities than before they started
their schooling, 235 and is measured by student achievement.236 Thus, in any
situation in which the teacher is not involved in the process of furthering
student education, the teacher should enjoy the freedom of expression as would
any typical citizen. The possible situations that a teacher could be in fit into
three categories: (1) direct involvement with student development; (2)
development of personal teaching skills during normal school time; or (3)
conduct wholly unrelated to the production interest of the school.
237
When a teacher falls within the first category, direct involvement with
student development, that teacher is an employee. The teacher falls into this
category when he is in school during school hours performing the tasks for
238which a teacher is paid. This includes chaperoning field trips that extend
beyond the normal hours of the school day because the teacher is still acting in
the capacity of a teacher. 9  During a lunch or break period in which the
on the employer's property during nonworking time, unless it can show that the rule is necessary
to maintain production or discipline.").
233. Peyton Packing, 49 N.L.R.B. at 844 ("If the rule had been promulgated for a bona fide
purpose, e. g., to prevent impairment of production, such purpose would have been served by
disciplining, in a reasonable manner, those employees who were apprehended in the act of
violating the rule." (emphasis added)).
234. Id at 843 ("[T]ime outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during
luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint
235. Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in the Public
Schools, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1141, 1150 (1986) ("[Schooling] is a service that transforms
fixed qualities of inputs (that is, individuals) into individuals with different qualities. Educational
studies concentrate-as they should-on 'quality' differences.").
236. Id. ("The output of the education process-that is, the achievement of individual
students-is directly related to a series of inputs.").
237. See E-mail from Thomas P. Christensen, Superintendent of Schools, Shamong
Township Public Schools (Oct. 31, 2007, 08:08 EDT; Oct. 10, 2007, 08:43:36 EDT) (on file with
author) (stating the possible situations that a teacher can be in include: (1) being in school during
school hours; (2) taking a professional day; (3) taking a sick or bereavement day; (4) being on
maternity or disability leave; (5) taking a personal day; (6) not being in school because school is
out of session because of a holiday or summer vacation; (7) being on sabbatical leave; or (8)
being on leave under the Family Medical Leave Act).
238. See, e.g., Peyton Packing, 49 N.L.R.B. at 843 ("Working time is for work.").
239. E-mail from Thomas P. Christensen, Superintendent of Schools, Shamong Township
Public Schools (Oct. 10, 2007, 08:43:36 EDT) (on file with author) ("A field trip is a part of the
school day . . . . It is just an extension of the classroom and the teacher has the same
responsibilities as he/she would in the classroom.").
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teacher does not need to supervise students, however, a teacher may express
himself freely because he is not affecting the production interest of the school
(the furtherance of the students' education).14 ° But, this freedom is limited by
the Tinker principle that the expression cannot "materially disrupt[] classwork
or involve[] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.", 41 Thus, a
teacher could not use his lunch period to express himself in school or on school
grounds if his expression would interfere with the ability for the school to
effectively further its students' education.
When a teacher falls within the second category, developing personal
teaching skills during normal school time, that teacher is also an employee.
This category includes professional days, which are defined as:
[D]ay[s] where a teacher is engaging in an activity(ies) that either
further their personal professional development or the professional
development of other staff members or even professionals outside
the district. For example, a teacher could be granted a professional
day to teach or in-service other teachers, to deliver a speech or
presentation to a group[ ](such as legislators, a community
organization, a professional organization), receive an award or
honor, etc.
242
Teachers are employees when they fall into this category because they are
affecting the production interest of the school, even if only indirectly. The
purpose of these days is for teachers to better their personal teaching skills or
to instruct other teachers. 243 Ultimately this affects the production interest of
the school because better teachers theoretically should be able to teach in a
more effective manner so their students' achievement will be higher than it
would be otherwise.
A teacher who falls within the third category, not affecting the production
interest of the school, is not an employee at all. This category includes days
when the teacher does not come into school for a reason other than
240. See Peyton Packing, 49 N.L.R.B. at 843. The NLRB stated that "time outside working
hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to
use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint ...." Id. (emphasis added).
241. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); see also
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (extending the Tinker holding to
sidewalks outside of the classroom). The Grayned Court explained:
[I]t would be highly unusual if the classic expressive gesture of the solitary picket
disrupts anything related to the school, at least on a public sidewalk open to
pedestrians. On the other hand, schools could hardly tolerate boisterous demonstrators
who drown out classroom conversation, make studying impossible, block entrances, or
incite children to leave the schoolhouse.
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119 (footnote omitted).
242. E-mail from Thomas P. Christensen, Superintendent of Schools, Shamong Township
Public Schools (Oct. 31, 2007, 08:08 EDT) (on file with author).
243. Id.
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24professional development and a substitute is hired. In this category, a
teacher informs the school of his or her expected absence from school,245 and
246
must have lesson plans prepared for the substitute. Learning, typically in the
form of review, takes place when a substitute teaches in lieu of the permanent
247teacher. Thus, the production interest of the school is not at stake when a
substitute is in the classroom rather than the permanent teacher. In addition, a
teacher falls into this category when he is not at school, during a holiday or
summer vacation. There is no production interest at stake when school is not
in session because students are not gathered in the classroom waiting to be
taught.
Taking these principles into account, any concern arising from the expansion
of the classroom is eliminated. The problem regarding the disintegration of the
public forum presented by the Tinker-Hazelwood standard is eradicated by
making this objective determination. A teacher's expression, while acting as a
private citizen, cannot be reprimanded by the school for his speech unless the
expression fails to meet the standard First Amendment analysis. 248  This
objective prong provides a vital safeguard to teachers and is simple to apply.
244. See id. Examples are sick days, personal days, maternity leave, disability leave, leave
under the Family Medical Leave Act, bereavement days, personal days, and sabbatical leave. Id.
245. E-mail from Deb Bailey, Math Teacher, Central School, Glencoe, Il. (Nov. 3, 2007,
15:33 EDT) (on file with author) (stating that a Central School teacher fills out a form to give to
the school detailing the date and reason for taking a personal day and explaining that a teacher
simply calls the school's secretary when he intends to take a sick day); e-mail from Thomas P.
Christensen, Superintendent of Schools, Shamong Township Public Schools (Nov. 2, 2007, 08:14
EDT) (on file with author) (explaining that a teacher posts his absence on a computer system for
substitutes to fill and noting that other districts have a "sub caller who fills positions by calling
subs after teachers call in their absence"); e-mail from Adrienne Warner Lopez, Third Grade
General Education Teacher, P.S. 146, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 1, 2007, 19:38 EDT) (on file with
author) (stating that approval from the principal is required for a personal day and informing the
school by telephone is required for a sick day); e-mail from Charlene Martin, Sixth Grade Math
Teacher, Indian Mills Memorial School (Nov. 1, 2007, 19:24 EDT) (on file with author)
(explaining the school's requirement that a teacher must inform the school of his or her absence
when taking a day off).
246. E-mail from Deb Bailey, Math Teacher, Central School, Glencoe, Ill. (Nov. 3, 2007,
15:33 EDT) (on file with author) (noting that Central School requires its teachers to "provide
detailed lesson plans for each of [their] classes .... "); e-mail from Adrienne Warner Lopez,
Third Grade General Education Teacher, P.S. 146, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 1, 2007, 19:38 EDT)
(on file with author); e-mail from Charlene Martin, Sixth Grade Math Teacher, Indian Mills
Memorial School (Nov. 1, 2007, 19:24 EDT) (on file with author) (stating that the school requires
teachers who take a day off to provide lesson plans for their substitutes).
247. E-mail from Adrienne Warner Lopez, Third Grade General Education Teacher, P.S.
146, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 11, 2007, 15:00 EDT) (stating that "substitutes are really just doing
review work"); e-mail from Charlene Martin, Sixth Grade Math Teacher, Indian Mills Memorial
School (Nov. 1, 2007, 19:24 EDT) (on file with author) (noting that the lesson plans that she
provides to substitutes "enhance the lessons" that she has "previously taught").
248. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When public
employees engage in expression unrelated to their employment while away from the workplace,
their First Amendment rights, are of course, no different from those of the general public.").
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If the teacher is an employee at the time of the expression, the teacher does
not enjoy the same First Amendment protection as a private citizen. 49 The
classroom is not the same as other settings. As courts have pointed out, the
classroom is unique, 25 and there is a captive audience problem.251 However,
Pickering-Connick balancing can account for these special circumstances when
the school proffers its interest for restricting the speech.
As previously discussed, the Sixth Circuit illustrates that Pickering-Connick
balancing is effective when used properly.252  Categorizing the speech as
something that touches upon a matter of political, social, or other significant
concern to the community is the appropriate beginning of this balancing test.
3
The definition of "a matter of public concern" allows courts to be flexible
when determining whether the speech will fall within the sphere of
protection. 254  First Amendment jurisprudence has consistently held that
255
speech on a matter of public concern is of the highest importance. Speech
that does not touch on a matter of public concern, but rather is a private
grievance, does not and should not be afforded special First Amendment
protection.
249. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
250. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (noting
"special characteristics of the school environment").
251. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007). The
court explained the captive audience phenomenon as follows: "Education is compulsory, and
children must attend public schools unless their parents are willing to incur the cost of private
education or the considerable time commitment of home schooling. Children who attend school
because they must ought not be subject to teachers' idiosyncratic perspectives." Id. at 479.
252. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053-55 (6th Cir. 2001)
(performing the balancing test and taking all interests into account as well as the interests'
legitimacy).
253. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 118-19, 121.
255. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) ("[Tlhe Court has frequently reaffirmed
that speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values' and is entitled to special protection." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Connick
Court cited NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). The Claiborne Court
found that "a major purpose of the boycott at issue was to influence governmental action."
Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 914. The Court held that "[t]he right of the States to regulate economic
activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated
boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed
by the Constitution itself." Id. The Connick Court also cited Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980). The Carey Court stated:
Public-issue picketing, "an exercise of ... basic constitutional rights in their most
pristine and classic form," has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security
of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."
Carey, 447 U.S. at 466-67 (citation omitted).
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The next step in the analysis requires the school to proffer an interest that
outweighs the interest of speaking on matters of public concern. 256 The Sixth
Circuit shows that this part of the Pickering-Connick balancing can be done
effectively. 257  The Cockrel court wisely took into consideration evidence
showing the school's proffered interests were not legitimate. 258 Furthermore,
contrary to some contentions, 259 the Pickering-Connick standard takes into
account the special circumstances of the classroom when addressing the
interests of the school. 260 The standard expressly requires that the school have
an interest that outweighs the interest of speaking on a matter of public concern
26in order to justify its restriction of speech. 61 Schools have argued that their
interests of harmony in the workplace and efficiency trump the interest of free
speech in cases where the court found the speech was on a matter of public
concern. 262  Their proffered interests most likely stem from the Pickering
wording: "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees." 263 However, there is
nothing to stop the school from arguing that the school's special environment
goes hand-in-hand with running an efficient school. Thus, a school could
successfully defend against a First Amendment claim by creatively
incorporating the special circumstances of the school environment into its
argument of efficiency.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tinker-Hazelwood standard should not be used to determine whether
public school teachers' classroom speech is protected by the First Amendment.
The Morse Court has blurred the line on what constitutes student speech,
namely, whether someone is a student or a citizen at the time of the expression.
As a result, the Tinker-Hazelwood standard, through Morse, erodes the First
Amendment protection afforded teachers. This is a fundamental flaw in the
Tinker-Hazelwood standard. The Pickering-Connick standard, however,
makes this distinction expressly, albeit the courts' have focused on the wrong
words of the standard. The Pickering-Connick standard is well suited for
256. See, e.g., Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1053. The court explained: "Having held that Cockrel's
speech touches on matters of public concern, we must now weigh the employee's interest in
speaking against the employer's interest in regulating the speech to determine if the speech is
constitutionally protected." Id.
257. Id. at 1054 (noting that the school's interests were not legitimate); see also supra note
127.
258. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1054.
259. See supra note 39.
260. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1054-55 (finding that the school's proffered interest in
efficient school operation does not outweigh the teacher's speech on a matter of public concern).
261. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "Pickering recognizes the need to balance competing interests.").
262. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1054; Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 738 (6th Cir. 2000).
263. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added).
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analyzing public school teachers' free speech rights if the courts begin the
inquiry with an objective finding of whether the teacher was "on the clock" at
the time of expression. 264  Otherwise, free speech protection afforded to
teachers when they are acting as ordinary citizens, as recognized in Pickering,
is diminished, thereby implicating the chilling effect that is so greatly
undesired.
264. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
1215
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 57:11831216
